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This paper examines the magnitude of public/private wage differentials in Pakistan 
using data drawn from the 2001-02 Pakistan Labour Force Survey. As in many other 
countries, public sector workers in Pakistan tend both to have higher average pay and 
education levels as compared to their private sector counterparts. In addition, the public 
sector in Pakistan has both a more compressed wage distribution and a smaller gender 
pay gap than that prevailing in the private sector. Our empirical analysis suggests that 
about two-fifths of the raw differential in average hourly wages between the two sectors 
is accounted for by differentials in average characteristics.  The estimated public sector 
mark-up, ceteris paribus, is of the order of 49 percent and is substantial by the standards 
of developed economies.  The quantile regression estimates suggest that the mark-up was 
found to decline monotonically with movement up the conditional wage distribution. In 
particular, the premium at the 10th percentile was estimated at 92 percent as compared to 
a more modest 20 percent at the 90th percentile.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In most economies, public sector employment accounts for a sizeable share of 
total employment.  The process of recruitment and promotion and the rules governing 
employment conditions tend to differ markedly across public and private sectors. The 
wage determination processes within the two sectors are distinct and have the potential 
to give rise to differentials in pay rewards between comparable workers in the two 
sectors.  The profit motives of private sector firms create incentives to set wages 
commensurate with worker productivity.  These motives are generally absent from the 
public sector and pay rewards are generally based on other criteria.   
The existence of inter-sectoral wage differentials can create problems for the 
dis-advantaged sector.  For instance, large pay differentials, ceteris paribus, in 
favour of the private sector may constrain the public sector’s ability to recruit and 
retain high-quality workers with implications for public sector productivity and 
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efficiency.  In addition, efforts by the state to maintain some degree of pay 
comparability for their employees with the private sector may compromise fiscal 
budgetary positions.  On the other hand, the existence of a positive differential in 
favour of the public sector, a common phenomenon in many developing economies, 
can give rise to job ‘queues’ and ‘wait’ unemployment given risk-averse agents’ 
preferences for stable and well-paid public sector jobs.  There may be sizeable 
opportunity costs associated with such behaviour.              
Knowledge of the magnitude of the public sector pay gap and how it varies 
across the wage distribution has important policy content.  The purpose of this paper 
is to investigate the public sector pay gap in Pakistan using data drawn from the 
recent Pakistan Labour Force Survey of 2001-02. This study differs from previous 
work that has explored the magnitude of the public-private pay gap in Pakistan in a 
number of distinct ways.  First, we control for endogenous selection into one of three 
employment sectors (viz., public, private, and state-owned enterprises (SOE)) though 
our primary concern is a comparison of the pay differential between the larger two of 
these.  Secondly, using mean regression analysis, we decompose the overall average 
pay differential between public and private sector workers into ‘endowment’ and 
‘treatment’ components.  Thirdly, given an established interest within the 
contemporary literature on the public sector pay gap, the heterogeneity in the pay 
gap across the conditional wage distribution is examined using quantile regression 
analysis.  The approach, however, presents a dual challenge. The first is concerned 
with the appropriate decomposition of pay gaps at selected quantiles into their 
‘endowment’ and ‘treatment’ components and the second relates to modelling 
selection bias within a quantile regression framework.  The emphasis in the paper 
falls more heavily on addressing the former of these challenges and our approach in 
regard to the latter is acknowledged as somewhat ad hoc.      
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The next section provides a brief 
review of both the Pakistan context and the more broadly defined empirical literature 
on the public sector pay gap. This assists in situating the present empirical work in a 
broader context.  Section Two outlines the econometric and decomposition 
methodologies used, and Section Three details the data set used.  Section Four 
discusses the results, and a final section offers some conclusions.   
 
1.  BACKGROUND 
 
1.1.  The Pakistan Context 
At partition in 1947, the newly formed Government of Pakistan lacked the 
personnel, institutions, and resources to play a large role in developing the economy. 
Exclusive public ownership was reserved for the production of armaments, the 
generation of hydroelectric power, and the manufacture and operation of railroads, 
telephone, telegraph, and wireless equipment. The rest of the economy was open to 
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private-sector development, and the government used many direct and indirect 
measures to stimulate or guide private-sector activities. The government enacted 
piecemeal measures between 1968 and 1971 to set minimum wages, promote 
collective bargaining for labour, reform the tax structure towards greater equity, and 
rationalise the salary structures. However, the implementation of these reforms was 
generally weak and uneven.  
In 1972, the government nationalised thirty-two large manufacturing plants in 
eight major industries. The public sector expanded greatly in this period. In addition 
to the nationalisation of companies, government agencies were created to support 
various functions, such as the export of cotton and rice.  Suitably qualified managers 
and technicians were scarce, a situation that became worse after 1974, when many of 
the more able left to seek higher salaries in the oil-producing countries of the Middle 
East. Labour legislation set high minimum wages and sizeable fringe benefits, 
boosting payroll costs in both public and private sectors.   
After 1977, the government adopted a policy of greater reliance on private 
enterprises to achieve economic goals, and successive governments continued this 
policy throughout the late 1980s and the early 1990s. However, the government 
continued to play a large economic role in this period, with public-sector enterprises 
accounting for a significant portion of large-scale manufacturing. In 1991, it was 
estimated that such enterprises produced about 40 percent of national industrial output. 
As of early 1994, proposals to end state monopolies in selected industries were in 
various stages of implementation. Private investment no longer required government 
authorisation, except in sensitive industries. In early 1994, the government announced 
its intention to continue policies of both deregulation and liberalisation. The rise in the 
share of the private sector reflected the policy shift towards a market-based economy as 
well as the government’s weakened fiscal position. 
In spite of the re-orientation of the economy towards the private sector in 
recent years, the competition for employment in the public sector remains keen in 
Pakistan. Public sector employment in Pakistan is still viewed as more attractive 
because of better pay, better working conditions, and the availability of other fringe 
benefits (e.g., pension rights and free medical benefits).    
 
1.2.  Empirical Literature Overview 
The stylised facts offered on the public sector for developed economies, once 
wage determining characteristics are accounted for, are of a modest average positive 
wage gap in favour of public sector workers.1  In addition, public sector pay practice 
 
1For example, see Blank (1994), Rees and Shah (1995), Disney and Gosling (1998) and Blackaby, 
Murphy and O’Leary (1999) for the UK; see Gyourko and Tracy (1988), Moulton (1990) and Blank 
(1994) for the US; see Lucifora and Meurs (2004) for UK, Italy and France.  The evidence for Germany 
[see Dustmann and Van Soest (1998)] is less clear-cut and that for Holland suggests a negative ceteris 
paribus differential [see Van Ophem (1993)]. 
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tends to attenuate the gender pay gap and narrow wage dispersion.  The average 
effects, however, conceal variations in the performance of the public sector pay 
premium across the conditional wage distribution.  In particular, a number of studies 
have documented a declining public sector pay premium in developed economies, 
with movement up the conditional wage distribution suggesting that public sector 
rewards are more substantial in the lower-paid jobs.2                  
The evidence for Latin America provides something of a contrast. Panizza 
(2000) examines the magnitude of the public/private sector pay gap for 17 countries 
over the 1980s and 1990s and reports average pay gaps that generally favour the 
private sector.3  Panizza (2000) also documents lower gender pay gaps in public 
sector labour markets.  In addition, Falaris (2003), using micro-level data for 
Panama, confirmed both a weak mean public sector premium and effects that 
declined with movement up the conditional wage distribution.  The evidence from 
Latin American countries tends to chime with what has emerged in transitional 
economies.  The development of a buoyant private sector is generally viewed as a 
key part of a successful transformation to a market economy.  The empirical 
literature on the ceteris paribus private sector wage premium in transitional 
economies is limited and beset by measurement issues4 but tends to suggest a 
positive wage premium in favour of private sector workers.5  
There has been a modest volume of empirical work undertaken on the public 
sector pay gap for developing countries. Boudarbat (2004) notes a preference for 
public sector employment in Africa and a willingness among the educated to engage 
in ‘wait’ unemployment to secure the more well paid and stable public sector jobs.  
The author notes a sizeable public sector pay differential in Morocco for the highly 
educated. The earlier studies of Lindauer and Sabot (1983) for Tanzania and Van der 
Gaag, Stelcner, and Vijverberg (1989) for Cote D’Ivoire provide mixed evidence on 
the size and direction of the pay gap but the latter paper highlights the importance of 
selection bias in informing any reasonable interpretation.  Terrell (1993), using data 
for Haiti, reports a relatively large average public sector pay gap with selection bias 
apparently relevant in only one sector. Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2005) detect no 
public sector wage effect using recent tracer survey data from Tanzania. Skyt-
Neilsen and Rosholm (2001) detected a positive average ceteris paribus pay gap in 
 
2For example, see Poterba and Rueben (1994) for the US; see Mueller (1998) for Canada; see 
Disney and Gosling (1998) and Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary (1999) for the UK; see Lucifora and 
Meurs (2004) for Italy and France.   
3Brazil was a notable exception here.  This is not a surprise since public sector workers in Brazil 
are known to be well-paid  [see Arbache, Dickerson, and Green (2004)].  
4See Filer and Hanousek (2002) for problems related to the measurement of the private sector in 
transitional economies. 
5See Newell and Socha (1998) and Adamchik and Bedi (2000) for Poland from the mid-1990s; 
see Lokshin and Jovanovic (2001) for a sample of Moscow workers; and see Krstic, Reilly and Tabet 
(2004) for a sample of Serbian workers.  
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favour of public sector workers in Zambia but noted that at the upper end of the 
conditional wage distribution it became negative for the highly educated.  A recent 
study by Ajwad and Kurukulasuriya (2002), the primary focus of which was gender 
and ethnic wage disparities, detected no public sector pay premium either at the 
average or across selected quantiles of the conditional wage distribution for Sri 
Lanka.  Finally, of direct relevance to our analysis, Nasir (2000), using data for 
Pakistan, detected a negligible differential in favour of public sector workers; but this 
study restricted the private sector comparator to the formal sector.   
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1.  Mean Regression Decompositions 
The magnitude of the public sector pay premium could be crudely captured by 
using a pooled sample of data points on all workers in conjunction with the OLS 
procedure.  If we assume a pooled sample of public and private sector data points 
and introduce the i subscripts for i=1,…,n, we could express the log wage equation 
with a simple intercept shift for the public sector as: 
wi = Xi′β+ δGi + ui … … … … … (1) 
where wi is the log wage for the ith individual; Xi is a k×1 vector of wage 
determining characteristics for the ith individual; β is a k×1 vector of the 
corresponding unknown parameters; Gi is a binary measure adopting a value of 1 
if the individual is in the public sector and 0 otherwise and δ is its corresponding 
unknown parameter;  ui is an error terms for the ith individual.  The OLS 
estimate for δ provides the average ceteris paribus effect of being in a public 
sector job on the expected log wage.          
The foregoing approach restricts the public sector premium to being captured 
by an intercept shift and ignores the fact that employment in the public sector may 
confer on the individual differential returns to, for example, education and 
experience.  The conventional Blinder (1973) or Oaxaca (1973) methodology has 
been extensively used in this field to address this potential problem and readily 
extends to applications where the investigator wishes to decompose pay gaps 
between groups of workers using other qualitative indicators (e.g., race or 
employment sector).  In our application, we are interested in decomposing the pay 
differential between public and private sector workers.  The procedure involves the 
OLS estimation of separate sectoral wage equations and the use of the OLS 
coefficients in conjunction with the sectoral mean characteristics to compute 
explained (or ‘endowment’) and unexplained (or ‘treatment’) effects.  The average 
mean difference in log wages ( D ) between two groups or sectors could be 
expressed as:     
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[ ] [ ]pspXspXsXwwD ps β−β′+β′−=−= ˆˆˆ   … … (2) 
where jw is the average logarithm of the wage for the jth
 employment sector; jX  is 
the vector of average characteristics for the jth employment sector; jβˆ is the vector of 
OLS wage determining coefficients for the jth employment sector; j = s, p where s 
denotes public (or state) sector and p denotes the private sector.6 
The overall average differential in log wages between the two sectors is thus 
decomposable into differences in characteristics (as evaluated at the returns in the 
public sector) and differences in the estimated relationship between the two sectors 
(i.e., the sectoral differences in returns) evaluated at the mean set of private sector 
characteristics).  It is clear that expression (2) could be re-cast using the ‘basket’ of 
average public sector characteristics as the use of an ‘index number’ approach is 
subject to the conventional ‘index number’ problem. However, given our application 
we believe the above decomposition provides the more meaningful basis for 
computing the mark-up of interest.      
 
2.2.  Quantile Regression Decompositions 
An exclusive focus on the average may provide a misleading impression as to the 
variation in the magnitude of the ceteris paribus gender pay gap across the wage 
distribution.  A number of different methods recently used in the literature allow for a 
more general counterfactual wage distributions under specific assumptions.  These 
methods generally require relatively large sample sizes and are prohibitive in a context 
where the samples available tend to be modest.7  The quantile regression approach [e.g., 
see Chamberlain (1994); Buchinsky (1998)] provides a less data-demanding alternative, 
but one that can be informative about the impact of covariates at different points of the 
conditional wage distribution.  In the use of a quantile regression model, the focus moves 
away from the mean to other selected points on the conditional wage distribution and the 
estimation procedure is formulated in terms of absolute rather than squared errors.  The 
estimator is known as the Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator.   
If we again assume the pooled model in (1) above as a reasonable 
characterisation of the wage determining process, the median regression coefficients 
can be obtained by choosing the coefficient values that minimise L 
L = ( ) ( )∑∑
==
δ−β−δ−β−=δ−β− n
i
iiiiiii
n
i
i GXwsgnGXwGiXw
1
'''
1
 … (3)  
where sgn(a) is the sign of a, 1 if a is positive, and –1 if  a is negative or zero. 
 
6For expositional purposes, the third sector, the SOE sector, is ignored here given the paper’s 
primary emphasis.  The relatively small sample size available for the SOE sector also restricts our 
discussion in the empirical section. 
7For example, see DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Fortin and Lemieux (1998), Donald, 
Green and Paarsch (2000) for a variety of different approaches. 
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The estimation of a set of conditional quantile functions potentially allows the 
delineation of a more detailed portrait of the relationship between the conditional 
wage distribution and the selected covariates (including public sector attachment).   
Given the linear formulation of the regression model, the coefficient estimates can be 
obtained using linear programming techniques.  In contrast to the OLS approach, the 
quantile regression procedure is less sensitive to outliers and provides a more robust 
estimator in the face of departures from normality [see Koenker (2005) and Koenker 
and Bassett (1978)].  Quantile regression models may also have better properties 
than OLS in the presence of heteroscedasticity [see Deaton (1997)].   
It is generally desirable to explore quantile regressions other than at the 
median.  Using this same methodology, the log wage equation may be estimated 
conditional on a given specification and then calculated at various percentiles of 
the residuals (e.g., the 10th, the 25th, the 75th or the 90th) by minimising the 
sum of absolute deviations of the residuals from the conditional specification.  In 
the context of the regression model specified, quantile regression estimation 
allows the estimation of the δ parameter at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles.  The estimates obtained for δ allow us to establish the magnitude of 
the ceteris paribus gender pay gap at different points of the conditional wage 
distribution.   
The asymptotic formula for the computation of the variance-covariance matrix 
is known to under-state the true variance covariance matrix in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. The more conventional approach adopted to compute the 
variance-covariance matrix is the bootstrapping method, and this procedure is 
adopted in the empirical applications reported in this study.8   
In the context of the estimation inherent in (3), the average ceteris paribus 
public sector pay gap is provided by the estimate for δ.  Chamberlain (1994) used 
this type of model to explore the wage effect of unions at different points of the 
conditional wage distribution.    However, the extensive literature on decomposing 
the mean pay gap, as emphasised in expression (2), employs separate wage equations 
for each sector.  In the context of the estimation of quantile regression models by 
sector, the decomposition of the pay gap at different quantiles is not entirely 
straightforward.  The decomposition within a quantile regression framework has 
been undertaken in a number of studies, [see Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman 
(2003); Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) and Machado and Mata (2000)].  One of the 
key issues in any decomposition is to determine the appropriate realisation of 
characteristics with which to undertake the counterfactual exercise. In the linear 
mean regression model, it is intuitive to use mean characteristics.  Although use of 
the mean characteristics is feasible with the estimated coefficients from quantile 
regressions, they may provide misleading realisations for the characteristics at points 
 
8See Brownestone and Valletta (2001) for an accessible introduction to bootstrapping. 
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other than the conditional mean wage to which they relate. It seems more appropriate 
to use realisations that more accurately reflect the relevant points on the conditional 
wage distribution.    
In order to appreciate this point more clearly, define the quantile regression 
for the public sector sub-sample as 
ws = Xs′ βθs + uθs … … … … … … (4) 
where Qθ(ws| Xs) = Xs′ βθs and Qθ(uθs | Xs) = 0 and θ denotes the particular quantile of 
interest.  In addition, Xs is a k×n1 matrix of characteristics for the sample of public 
sector workers where n1 is the sample size, βθs is a k×1 vector of unknown 
parameters for the θth public sector regression quantile.    
Define the quantile regression for the private sector sub-sample as: 
wp =  Xp′ βθp  + uθp … … … … … … (5) 
where Qθ(wp| Xp) = Xp′ βθp and Qθ(uθp | Xp) = 0.  In this case Xp is a k×n2 matrix of 
characteristics for the sample of private sector workers where n2 is the sample size, βθp 
is a k×1 vector of unknown parameters for the θth private sector regression quantile.    
Now: 
Qθ(ws) = E[Xs | ws = Qθ(ws)]′ βθs + E[uθs | ws = Qθ(ws)] … … (6) 
and  
Qθ(wp) = E[Xp| wp = Qθ(wp)]′ βθp + E[uθp | wp = Qθ(wp)] … … (7) 
where E(·) denotes the expectations operator.  In this case E[uθs | ws = Qθ(ws)] ≠ 0 and 
E[uθp | wp= Qθ(wp)] ≠ 0.  The characteristics used in (6) and (7) are evaluated 
conditionally at the unconditional log wage quantile value.  In addition, the terms 
E[uθs | ws = Qθ(ws)] and E[uθp | wp = Qθ(wp)] are non-zero and provide an indication as 
to whether at a given quantile, the regression model over-predicts or under-predicts 
the log wage.  These terms do not appear in the mean regression and thus, in a 
quantile regression decomposition, there will be some part of the pay gap left 
unassigned to either the ‘endowment’ or ‘treatment’ components at all quantiles of 
the conditional wage distribution.          
We now turn to decomposing the public-private sector pay gap at different 
points of the conditional wage distribution.  The pay gap at the θth quantile is 
defined as ∆θ and this can be decomposed into three parts: 
∆θ  =  Qθ(ws) – Qθ(wp)  
     =  [ E[Xs | ws = Qθ(ws)] – E[Xp | wp = Qθ(wp)]]′ βθs  
                + E[Xp | wp = Qθ(wp)]′[ βθs – βθs] 
                + [E[uθs | ws = Qθ(ws)] – E[uθp | wp = Qθ(wp)]] … … (8) 
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This represents the quantile regression analogue to the mean decomposition 
reported in (2).  The first part is the conventional ‘endowment’ part and gives the 
portion of the gap at the θth quantile explained by sectoral differences in the 
conditional mean characteristics at this point.  The second part is the conventional 
‘treatment’ component evaluated not at the unconditional mean (E[Xp]) but at a mean 
value conditional on the particular quantile value of the private sector log wage. The 
final component gives that portion of the difference in log wages not explained by 
the quantile regressions for the two sectors.  In order to implement this procedure we 
need to compute the component parts of (8).  We use an auxiliary regression 
approach based on Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005).  The approach is outlined in a 
technical appendix to this paper.      
 
2.3.  Selectivity Bias Issues 
There is a selection issue for the analysis of the public sector pay gap and one 
that has been strongly emphasised in the literature based on mean regression 
analysis.9 Either through a process of self-selection by individuals or sample 
selection by employers, the location of individuals in either sector may not be 
interpretable as the outcome of a random process.  In the context of the mean 
regression model Heckman (1979) and Lee (1983) provide well-known solutions.   
As noted by Neuman and Oaxaca (2004), selectivity correction procedures 
introduce a number of ambiguities for standard wage decomposition analysis.  The 
wage decomposition favoured by many authors10 in the presence of such a correction 
is usually expressed as     
[ ] [ ] [ ]ppsspspspsps XXXwwD λτ−λτ+β−β′+β′−=−= ˆˆˆˆˆ   … (9) 
where everything is defined as in (2) above but with jτˆ now representing the OLS 
estimate of the j selection parameter, one for each employment sector, and jλ is the 
sample averaged selection variable for the jth employment group computed as the 
inverse of the Mills ratio term using estimates from a probit model for sectoral 
attachment as per Heckman (1979) or through the Lee (1983) term based on use of a 
multinomial logit model.    
Currently, there is little consensus regarding the most appropriate correction 
procedure for selectivity bias in quantile regression models. Buchinsky (1999) uses 
the work of Newey (1999) to approximate the selection term by a higher order series 
expansion. The power series is based on the inverse Mills ratio (or its Lee 
 
9See Gyourko and Tracy (1988), Van der Gaag and Vijerberg  (1988), and Terrell (1993). 
10For instance, Reimers (1983) who nets the selection differences out of the overall pay gap to 
generate wage offer differentials.  
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equivalent).11 This approach has the potential pitfall that the wage regression 
intercept term is not identified given its conflation with the constant term associated 
with the higher order series that proxies for the selection bias.12 Given the lack of 
consensus and problems associated with introducing higher order selection terms 
into quantile regression models, we adopt the rather crude expedient of inserting the 
simple selection terms into the quantile regression models. It is acknowledged that, 
in contrast to the mean regression case, this provides an inexact correction for 
selection bias. However, it circumvents the tricky problem of identifying the wage 
regression constant term.   
We now turn to decomposing the public-private sector pay gap at different 
points of the conditional wage distribution having corrected for selection bias.  The 
pay gap at the θth quantile is now decomposed into four parts: 
∆θ  =  Qθ(ws) – Qθ(wp)  
= [E[Xs | ws = Qθ(ws)] – E[Xp | wp = Qθ(wp)]]′ βθs 
+ E[Xp | wp = Qθ(wp)]′[βθs – βθs] 
+ [τθs E[λs| ws = Qθ(ws)] – [τθp E[λp| ws = Qθ(ws)]] 
+ [E[uθs | ws = Qθ(ws)] – E[uθp | wp = Qθ(wp)]] … … (10) 
where the third component is the selection effect.   
Finally, in order to address the problem of selectivity bias we exploit the 
procedure developed by Lee (1983), as used by Gyourko and Tracy (1988) in a similar 
application, which provides a more general approach to the correction of selectivity bias 
than that originally offered by Heckman (1979).  The procedure is two-step but exploits 
estimates from a multinomial logit model (MNL) rather than a probit to construct the set 
of selection correction terms.  The estimation of models with selection effects always 
contains difficulties.  In addition, their identification is always a demanding task.  The 
eminently sensible advice of Gyourko and Tracy (1988) to compute and report both 
corrected and uncorrected differentials is adhered to in this study.13    
 
3.  DATA 
This study uses cross-section data drawn from the nationally representative 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) for Pakistan for 2001-2.  The working sample used is 
based on those in wage employment and comprises a total of 7352 workers once 
missing values and unusable observations are discarded.  This total consists of 3694, 
3310 and 348 workers in the private, public and state owned enterprise (SOE) sectors 
respectively. The government sector includes federal government, provincial 
 
11See also Fitzenberger (2003) for an alternative approach. 
12Heckman (1990) and Andrews and Shafgans (1998) suggest solutions to this problem. 
13In order to conserve space, the MNL estimates are not reported in this study.  
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government and local bodies. State owned enterprises (SOEs) are defined as public 
enterprises and public limited companies. Thus, over one-half of waged employees 
are in the public sector.   
The private sector is defined here to include workers employed in private 
limited companies, cooperative societies, individual ownership and partnerships.  It 
is sometimes argued that, in an analysis of the public/private sector pay gap in 
developing countries, it is desirable to disaggregate the private sector into formal and 
informal sectors.14  This is largely a matter of investigator preference and our 
approach is to retain a sufficiently broad definition of the private sector.  Any dis-
aggregation of the private sector along such lines is likely to be prone to potential 
misclassification and measurement error, and is thus eschewed in this study.      
The data collection for the LFS is spread over four quarters of the year in 
order to capture any seasonal variations in activity. The survey covers all urban and 
rural areas of the four provinces of Pakistan as defined by the 1998 Population 
Census. The LFS excludes the federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), military 
restricted areas, and protected areas of NWFP. These exclusions are not seen as 
significant since the relevant areas constitute about 3 percent of the total population 
of Pakistan.  
Table A1 of the appendix presents the summary statistics and definitions of 
the variables used in our analysis. The natural logarithm of the hourly wage15 is used 
as the dependent variable. Table A1 highlights the fact that the public and SOE 
sectors are relatively high pay sectors with large concentrations of professionals, 
graduates and postgraduates. A detailed dis-aggregation of educational qualifications 
is used in our analysis and this facilitates the computation of private rates of returns 
to these qualifications.  
In order to examine the relationship between earnings and age from the 
perspective of human capital theory, age and its quadratic are used in the 
specifications.16  These measures are actually designed to proxy for labour force 
experience, which cannot be accurately measured using our data source. Our analysis 
is restricted to those aged between 15 and 60 years of age.  This facilitates a more 
worthwhile comparison between public and private sector workers. The marital 
status of a respondent is divided into three mutually exclusive categories (viz., 
“married”, “never married” and “widow and divorced”). The settlement type within 
which the individual resides is captured by a binary control for residing in an urban 
area.  Four regional controls are included and these correspond to the four provinces 
in Pakistan (viz., Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP).  A set of controls capturing 
 
14This was the approach adopted by Nasir (2000), using data drawn from an earlier round of the 
LFS. 
15The hourly wages expressed in rupees, were calculated by dividing weekly earnings by the 
number of hours worked per week. 
16The use of age and its quadratic also renders the construction of the conditional vector of 
characteristics at different quantiles somewhat easier.  
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the time the respondent spent in the current district is also included in our analysis.  
The notion here is that location specific human capital and social networks may be 
important in the wage determination process.  This may be particularly relevant in 
the private sector.  
It is an established fact that an individual’s occupation is a very important 
determinant of their earnings. Nine one-digit occupational categories, defined 
according to the standard classification of occupations, are thus included in our 
specifications. As reported in Table A1, the public sector is characterised by a high 
proportion of technicians and skilled professionals. However, in the private sector 
there is a higher concentration of craft and related trade workers.  
Female labour force participation is low in Pakistan.  On the basis of our 
sample only 12 percent of public sector employees and about 3 percent of those in 
private sector waged employment are women.  The inclusion of women in our 
empirical analysis is a judgment call.  A sub-theme of our analysis is to explore the 
impact that public sector employment exerts on the gender pay gap. The use of an 
intercept shift to capture gender helps inform this issue, though perhaps imperfectly.  
We are particularly interested in examining the extent to which the public sector in 
Pakistan attenuates the gender pay gap and the extent to which there is evidence of a 
‘glass ceiling’ in either of these two sectors.     
It is important to note that Labour Force Survey does not provide information 
regarding fringe benefits received by workers.  Thus our analysis is restricted to a 
wage gap defined in monetary terms. If these additional pecuniary measures (e.g., 
fringe benefits) and other non-pecuniary factors (e.g., working conditions and 
stability of employment) are allowed for, the estimated public-private premium is 
likely to be even larger than our estimates reported here. There is some evidence that 
this is indeed the case in other countries. For example, Ichniowski (1980) found the 
relative union/non-union fringe benefit differentials for fire-fighters to be roughly 
four times as large as the comparable wage differentials.  The magnitude is much 
larger than that found by Freeman (1981) in his public/private sector studies. It 
would be desirable to have information regarding labour market fringe benefits 
available in the Labour Force Survey. The availability of such information would 
enhance understanding about the true magnitude of the inter-sectoral differentials 
between the public and private sectors. However, in the absence of such data our 
results carry a caveat and should be taken to reflect the lower limit of the inter-
sectoral differential between public and private sector workers. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The specified wage equations included controls for highest education 
qualification attained, whether an individual undertook technical training, age and its 
quadratic, martial status, gender, settlement type, a set of regional controls, a set of 
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dummies for the length of time resident in the district, and a set of one-digit 
occupational controls.  For brevity, only the estimates relating to the education, age 
gender, and sectoral attachment are reported in the tables.  Table 1 reports the 
estimates for a pooled regression model based on expression (1) where the public 
sector enters as an intercept shift and provides an estimate of the public sector ceteris 
paribus mark-up relative to the broadly defined private sector base.  Estimates for a 
mean regression and models estimated at selected quantiles of the conditional wage 
distribution are also recorded in this table.  In addition, estimates for an inter-quantile 
regression model based on differences between the 90th and 10th quantiles are 
reported. 
The mean regression estimates suggest a sizeable premium to both graduate 
and postgraduate qualifications in the Pakistan labour market.17  There is also a 
modest premium of just over 5 percent associated with having undertaken technical 
training. Women appear to encounter a significant disadvantage in the labour market.  
Men, on average and ceteris paribus, earn approximately 33 percent more than 
women in terms of hourly wages. Although the estimated signs on the linear and 
quadratic terms in age are consistent with human capital theory, the turning-point is 
implausible. This suggests that, at the average, wages and earnings are better 
specified as being linearly related.18 The estimates for the quantile regression model 
at the median are broadly in comport with the mean regression results and this could 
be taken to imply that outliers exert little influence on our mean estimates. The inter-
quantile regression coefficients reveal that holding postgraduate qualifications and 
undertaking training have stronger effects at the top end of the conditional wage 
distribution than at the bottom end and this might have implications for wage 
inequality.  In contrast to a substantial literature on the ‘glass ceiling’ from 
developed economies, there is little evidence from the quantile regression estimates 
that the gender effect increases with movement across the conditional wage 
distribution.  On the contrary, the evidence from Pakistan is that the ceteris paribus 
gender pay gap declines across the wage distribution with the inter-quantile 
regression estimates suggesting a decline of almost 30 percent between the 90th and 
10th percentiles.  Thus, women in the higher paid jobs in Pakistan are not as 
disadvantaged as many of their western counterparts.19           
The pooled regression model provides a framework for computing the public 
sector pay premium as per expression (1).  The average ceteris paribus mark-up 
relative to the private sector is estimated of the order of 45 percent.  This premium 
declines sharply with movement up the conditional wage distribution, a fact 
consistent  with  the  existing  literature  on  the  public  sector  pay  gap in developed  
 
17The average annualised rate of return to a professional qualification, an undergraduate degree, 
and a postgraduate degree are 9.2 percent, 9.1 percent, and 10.8 percent respectively.  
18Alternatively, the age measure could be expressed using splines.  
19For example, see Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman (2003) for the case of Sweden. 
Table 1 
OLS and Quantile Regression Model Estimates Based on Pooled Data for Pakistan 2001-02 
Variables Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 90th – 10th 
Primary 0.0914*** 
(0.0193) 
0.0804** 
(0.0425) 
0.0842*** 
(0.0243) 
0.0683*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0781*** 
(0.0178) 
0.0651*** 
(0.0268) 
–0.0152 
(0.0456) 
Middle 0.1569*** 
(0.0210) 
0.1873*** 
(0.0388) 
0.1554*** 
(0.0223) 
0.1233*** 
(0.0188) 
0.1231*** 
(0.0206) 
0.1366*** 
(0.0271) 
–0.0506 
(0.0456) 
Matriculation 0.2443*** 
(0.0203) 
0.2454*** 
(0.0362) 
0.2134*** 
(0.0214) 
0.2072*** 
(0.0209) 
0.2309*** 
(0.0191) 
0.2496*** 
(0.0298) 
0.0042 
(0.0469) 
Inter. 0.3629*** 
(0.0251) 
0.3777*** 
(0.0397) 
0.3185*** 
(0.0317) 
0.3144*** 
(0.0259) 
0.3360*** 
(0.0282) 
0.3797*** 
(0.0366) 
0.0024 
(0.0485) 
Profe. 0.8238*** 
(0.0599) 
0.5169*** 
(0.0697) 
0.6147*** 
(0.0772) 
0.7161*** 
(0.0748) 
0.9008*** 
(0.0814) 
1.1369*** 
(0.1413) 
0.6199*** 
(0.1424) 
University 0.5443*** 
(0.02885) 
0.4721*** 
(0.04200) 
0.4425*** 
(0.0332) 
0.4782*** 
(0.0298) 
0.5438*** 
(0.0310) 
0.6088*** 
(0.0486) 
0.1367 
(0.0669) 
P/Grad. 0.7598*** 
(0.0364) 
0.6261*** 
(0.0535) 
0.6514*** 
(0.0362) 
0.6746*** 
(0.0411) 
0.7195*** 
(0.0412) 
0.8121*** 
(0.0623) 
0.1859*** 
(0.0757) 
Training 0.0510** 
(0.0290) 
0.0111 
(0.0335) 
0.0245 
(0.0285) 
0.0252 
(0.0244) 
0.0281 
(0.0275) 
0.0787** 
(0.0397) 
0.0675* 
(0.0503) 
Age 0.0392*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0507*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0425*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0346*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0402*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0318*** 
(0.0052) 
–0.0188** 
(0.0107) 
Agesq –0.0003*** 
(5.86E–05) 
–0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
–0.0004*** 
(0.00006) 
–0.0003*** 
(0.00006) 
–0.0003*** 
(0.00005) 
–0.00027*** 
(0.00007) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
Nmarr –0.0633*** 
(0.02114) 
–0.0471* 
(0.0351) 
–0.0583*** 
(0.0216) 
–0.0421** 
(0.0220) 
–0.0364** 
(0.0187) 
–0.0612** 
(0.0289) 
–0.0140 
(0.0441) 
Continued— 
Table 1—(Continued) 
Wnd –0.0165 
(0.0534) 
–0.0425 
(0.0935) 
–0.0109 
(0.0780) 
0.0163 
(0.0503) 
–0.0156 
(0.0458) 
–0.0194 
(0.0843) 
0.0231 
(0.1234) 
Gender 0.2838*** 
(0.0259) 
0.5024*** 
(0.0622) 
0.3644*** 
(0.0321) 
0.2128*** 
(0.0281) 
0.1596*** 
(0.0294) 
0.1470*** 
(0.0275) 
–0.3554*** 
(0.0697) 
Public 0.3747*** 
(0.0151) 
0.5621*** 
(0.0255) 
0.4563*** 
(0.0163) 
0.3686*** 
(0.0166) 
0.2762*** 
(0.0159) 
0.1878*** 
(0.0237) 
–0.3743*** 
(0.0315) 
SOE 0.3339*** 
(0.0301) 
0.3508*** 
(0.0585) 
0.3529*** 
(0.0382) 
0.3520*** 
(0.0292) 
0.2914*** 
(0.0307) 
0.3037*** 
(0.0600) 
–0.0471 
(0.0791) 
Constant 1.2043*** 
(0.0908) 
0.1870 
(0.1774) 
0.8186*** 
(0.1045) 
1.4155*** 
(0.0906) 
1.6261*** 
(0.0916) 
2.0666*** 
(0.1161) 
1.8795** 
(0.2157) 
R2/Psuedo–R2 0.5312 0.3202 0.3434 0.3564 0.3783 0.4006  N/a 
Sample Size 7352 7352 7352 7352 7352 7352 7352 
Notes:  (a) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively using two-tailed tests. 
 (b) Wage equation specifications also include controls for residing in an urban settlement, four provincial controls, eight occupation controls, and four 
controls capturing the time spent in the district of residence. 
 (c) Standard errors are in parentheses.  The OLS standard errors are based on Huber (1967) and the quantile regression model estimates are based on 
bootstrapping with 200 replications.  
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economies.  In the lowest paid jobs located at the 10th percentile of the conditional 
wage distribution, the mark-up is computed at 92 percent compared to a more 
modest 21 percent in the higher paid jobs at the 90th percentile.  The inter-quantile 
regression estimates confirms that these differentials are statistically different from 
each other at a conventional level of statistical significance.  This finding serves to 
highlight the wage compressing labour market effects of the public sector in 
Pakistan.20            
Our attention now turns to the results from separate estimation of the public and 
private sector wage equations and the computation of the ‘mark-ups’ using expressions 
(2) and (9) for the mean regressions and expressions (8) and (10) for the quantile 
regressions.  Tables A2 to A5 in the Appendix report the sectoral wage equation 
estimates with and without corrections for selection bias.21  The estimates are not 
discussed in detail here, though a number of points are worth making about the mean 
regression estimates.  Firstly, the returns to the higher educational qualifications are 
generally lower in the public compared to the private sector. This is particularly valid 
for professional qualifications and undergraduate degrees (see Table A6).  On average, 
it would appear that the more highly qualified public sector workers trade-off 
substantial wage returns for the security and other non-wage benefits associated with 
the public sector.22  Secondly, and as encountered in the pooled regression model, the 
use of the quadratic in age in the public sector generates an implausible turning point.  
This indicates that, in this particular case, the linear effect is considerably more 
important and suggests that in the public sector pay and age are linked in a very strong 
linear fashion.  Thirdly, the gender pay gap in favour of males is considerably lower in 
the public sector (16 percent) compared to the private sector (53 percent), and this is 
true at all selected quantiles of the conditional wage distribution.  
Table 2 reports the decomposition of the mean public/private sector pay gap.  
The estimates are based on models with and without correction for selection.  In raw 
terms the average gap in log hourly wages between the public and private sector is 
0.685.23  In  other  words,  public  sector  worker  earn, on average, almost double the  
 
20The SOE effect is comparable to the public sector effect in the mean regression but exhibits a 
greater degree of stability across the conditional wage distribution as confirmed by the inter-quantile 
regression estimate. However, the small sample size merits extreme caution in interpreting the quantile 
regression estimates.  
21There is marginal evidence that selection bias is an issue for our estimates. This may reflect the 
quality of the instruments used for our empirical analysis.  However, there is a dearth of good instruments 
available in the dataset and this is the best that can be done under the circumstances. 
22For instance, the rate of return to a professional qualification is nearly seven percentage points 
lower in the public sector and over 11 percentage points lower for an undergraduate degree holder than in 
the private sector.    
23This is in contrast to Nasir (2000) who found little difference in overall wages between the 
public sector and the formal private sector and negative treatment effects.  This work is not directly 
comparable to our analysis given that we do not distinguish between formal and informal segments of the 
private sector.  
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Table 2 
Mean Decomposition of Sectoral Pay Gaps 
 
Due to 
Treatment 
Due to 
Endowments 
Due to Selection 
Terms Total 
Public/Private 0.3985*** 
(0.0195) 
0.2862*** 
(0.0154) 
Not applicable 0.6847 
 0.4401*** 
(0.1315) 
0.2840*** 
(0.0690) 
–0.0394 0.6847 
SOE/Private 0.3034*** 
(0.0469) 
0.3366*** 
(0.0366) 
Not applicable 0.6399 
 0.3963 
(0.5822) 
0.3309*** 
(0.0610) 
–0.0873 0.6399 
Public/SOE 0.0191 
(0.0297) 
0.0255** 
(0.0089) 
Not applicable 0.0447 
 –0.0276 
(0.5378) 
0.0245 
(0.0333) 
0.0479 0.0447 
Notes: (a) The first row in each panel relates to decompositions based on wage equations uncorrected for 
selection using expression (2) in the text. The second row relates decompositions based on wage 
equations corrected for selection using expression (9) in the text.  (b) Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses though these are not computed for the selection effects.  (c) ***,** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively using two-tailed 
tests. 
 
hourly wages of all private sector workers.  Over 40 percent of this differential is 
accounted by differentials in the average basket of characteristics between the two 
sectors.  The ‘treatment’ effect accounts for the remainder and the estimated mark-up 
and is of the order of 49 percent, which compares favourably with the estimate based 
on the pooled OLS estimator.  The correction for selection widens the ‘treatment’ 
effect slightly but the picture is not materially altered by the use of this correction 
procedure. The differentials between the private and SOE sectors and the public and 
SOE sectors are also reported in this table for completeness.  There is no statistical 
difference between the public and SOE sectors and the SOE mark-up on the private 
sector is of comparable magnitude to the public sector premium reported above.          
Table 3 reports the decompositions between the public and private sectors 
based on the quantile regression models.24  The tables respectively report estimates 
with and without correction for selection bias.  The raw differentials are widest at the 
bottom end of the conditional wage distribution and the differential in wages at the 
median  is  close  to  the  mean estimate  reported  in  Table 2.   The  raw differentials  
 
24The decompositions based on comparisons between SOE and private sector and SOE and public 
sector are reported in Tables A6 and A7 of the Appendix. 
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Table 3 
Decomposition of Sectoral Wage Gaps at Selected Quantiles:  Public/Private 
 
Due to 
Treatment 
Due to 
Endowments 
Selection  
Terms Residuals Total 
Public/Privateθ=0.10 0.65026*** 
(0.0504) 
0.16274*** 
(0.0320) 
Not applicable 0.0831 0.8961 
 0.7044*** 
(0.2245) 
0.1603** 
(0.0970) 
–0.0411 0.0724 0.8961 
Public/Private θ=0.25 0.5305*** 
(0.0239) 
0.2138*** 
(0.0170) 
Not applicable –0.0022 0.742 
 0.72524*** 
(0.1546) 
0.13236** 
(0.0764) 
–0.1103 –0.0052 0.742 
Public/Private θ=0.5 0.4105*** 
(0.01870) 
0.2775*** 
(0.0781) 
Not applicable 0.02804 0.6524 
 0.6000*** 
(0.1253) 
0.1384 
(0.1547) 
–0.1251 0.039 0.6524 
Public/Private θ=0.75 0.2881*** 
(0.02144) 
0.3483*** 
(0.0187) 
Not applicable –0.0386 0.5978 
 0.23796** 
(0.1032) 
0.4054*** 
(0.0670) 
–0.0052 –0.0404 0.5978 
Public/Private θ=0.9 0.1865*** 
(0.03255) 
0.2738*** 
(0.1166) 
Not applicable 0.1656 0.626 
 0.19434 
(0.1668) 
0.2839** 
(0.1357) 
0.0389 0.1087 0.626 
Notes: (a) The first row in each panel relates to decompositions based on wage equations uncorrected for 
selection using expression (8) in the text. The second row relates decompositions based on wage 
equations corrected for selection using expression (10) in the text.  (b) Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses but are not readily computable for the selection of residual terms.  (c) ***,** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively using 
two-tailed tests. 
 
generally decline with movement up the selected percentiles.  The ‘treatment’ effects 
are statistically well determined and decline monotonically across the selected 
quantiles of the conditional wage distribution.  In general, they are close in 
magnitude to those reported for the pooled quantile regression model in Table 1.    
The portion of the raw differential that is accounted for by differentials in 
endowments increases with movement up the distribution. However, the residual 
terms consequent on the quantile decomposition, and flagged in expression (8), are 
relatively large at the extreme ends of the distribution.  The differentials based on 
correcting for selection bias provide few new insights on either the magnitude or 
evolution of the public sector premium across the conditional wage distribution and 
are not the subject of separate discussion here. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Public sector employment accounts for over one-half of waged employment in 
Pakistan.  The empirical analysis undertaken in this study for Pakistan tends to 
concur with the summary consensus offered by Gregory and Borland (1999) on 
public sector labour markets in developed countries.  As elsewhere, public sector 
workers in Pakistan tend to have both higher average pay and education levels as 
compared to their private sector counterparts. In addition, the public sector in 
Pakistan has a more compressed wage distribution and a smaller gender pay gap than 
that prevailing in the private sector.         
Our empirical analysis suggests that about two-fifths of the raw differential in 
average wages between the public and private sector is accounted by differentials in 
average characteristics.  The estimated ceteris paribus public sector mark-up is of the 
order of 49 percent and is substantial by the standards of developed economies.  The 
mark-up was found to decline monotonically with movement up the conditional 
wage distribution. In particular, the premium at the 10th percentile was estimated at 
92 percent as compared to a more modest 20 percent at the 90th percentile.   
The existence of a sizeable public-private sector differential has obvious 
implications for the Pakistan labour market and can create ‘queues’ for public sector 
jobs given they are comparatively well-paid across a spectrum of low- and high-paid 
jobs.  An obvious agenda for future research would be to investigate the extent to 
which these differentials influence sectoral attachment and give rise to the 
phenomenon of ‘wait’ unemployment.   
Finally, employment in the public sector is generally viewed as an attractive 
option in Pakistan not only because of the wage differentials documented in this study but 
also as a consequence of the perquisites, such as housing, free telephone provision for 
civil servants, job security, free medical benefits, etc., associated with employment in this 
sector.  Public sector employment in Pakistan could be interpreted as providing rent-
seeking opportunities for some.  The tax-payer is not represented at the negotiating table 
and the state bureaucracy has an incentive to conceal the nature and magnitude of 
spending on such fringe benefits. The expenditure on fringe benefits impacts strongly on 
the national exchequer but also bestows an unfair advantage on the public sector relative 
to the private sector.  This subsidised advantage curtails the potential for the private 
sector’s development, a key ingredient for an economy’s transformation and its 
sustainable long-term economic growth.  One issue that warrants consideration for future 
research in this area would be an investigation into the magnitude of such fringe benefits 
in Pakistan and their contribution to the more broadly defined public-private sector 
differential. It would be informative to investigate within this framework the likely cost 
implications to the national exchequer if fringe benefits were actually replaced by cash 
payments.  It is an empirical question whether such a policy would reduce the overall cost 
to the exchequer, but it would certainly introduce a greater degree of transparency to 
public sector spending.  
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Appendices 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
In order to illustrate the computation of vectors for the realisations of 
explanatory variables conditional on log wage quantile values using the Gardeazabal 
and Ugidos (2005) method, we use decomposition (8) reported in the text. 
 (1) Qθ(ws) and Qθ(wp) are easily computed.  For example, the quantile 
regression of log public (private) sector wages on a constant term yields 
the relevant log wage at the particular quantile for the public (private) 
sector. 
 (2) The quantile regression procedure outlined above yields estimates for the 
parameter vectors (βθs and βθp). 
 (3) The computation of the conditional expectation terms E[Xs | ws = Qθ(ws)] 
and E[Xp | wp = Qθ(wp)] involves a bit more work.  We need to distinguish 
between three types of explanatory variables generally used in a wage 
specification. These are: (i) continuous explanatory variables; (ii) single 
binary explanatory variables; and (iii) sets of mutually exclusive binary 
explanatory variables.  These three cases are now examined in turn. 
 
(i)  Continuous Explanatory Variables  
In this case we regress the continuous explanatory variable (e.g., age) on the 
log of the wage using a linear bivariate regression.  Assume the following model is 
estimated by OLS using the sub-sample of private sector workers:          
Agei = α0 + α1wi+ ui 
In order to compute the age conditional on the log wage at the θth quantile, we 
evaluate: 
[ ] )(ˆˆ)(ˆ 10 ppi wQwpQwAgeE θθ α+α==   
where the wage value used in the OLS regression is the private sector log wage at the 
θth quantile.  The conditional mean now gives us the predicted private sector age at 
the θth quantile’s private sector log wage.  A similar exercise can then be undertaken 
to obtain the conditional expectation using the public sector log wage. 
 
(ii) A Single Binary Variable 
In this case, we use a logit model and regress the single binary variable (e.g., 
gender) on the log of the wage using the sub-sample of private sector workers.  Then: 
[ ] [ ] )(ˆˆ)(ˆ 10 pp wQFwpQwgenderE θθ γ+γ==   
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where F represents the CDF for the logistic and 0γˆ and 1γˆ represent the relevant 
maximum likelihood logit coefficient estimates. The wage value used in conjunction 
with these estimates is the private sector log wage at the θth quantile. A similar 
exercise can again be undertaken to obtain the conditional expectation using the 
public sector log wage. 
 
(iii)  A Set of Mutually Exclusive Binary Variables  
In this case, we use a multinomial logit model and regress the variable with 
say k outcomes (e.g., occupation coded 1, 2, 3..., k) on the private sector log wage.  
The multinomial logit coefficients are then used to compute predicted outcomes at 
the different quantiles of the public (or public) sector log wage. Gardeazabal and 
Ugidos (2005) suggest the use of a binary regression model for all binary variables.  
We argue that it is more appropriate to use a multiple outcome model where the 
outcomes relate to a set of mutually exclusive binary variables.       
 (4) The final component of the decomposition can then be computed as a 
residual given that the remainder of the information is already available 
through steps 1 to 3 above. 
 
  3 
Appendix Table A1 
Summary Statistics 
  Public Private SOE 
Variable Definition Mean Mean Mean 
Lnhw 
 
Log of the hourly wage  3.203 
(0.593) 
 2.518 
(0.709) 
 3.158 
(0.724) 
Age Age of individual in years 37.149 
 (9.294) 
30.233 
(11.015) 
35.986 
(10.548) 
Nfe 
 
 = 1 No formal education and 
 = 0, otherwise .1419 .3351 .2298 
Prim 
 
 =1 if individual has completed initial five years of education i.e., primary but 
below middle; = 0, otherwise .1033 .2049 .1264 
Middle 
 
 =1 if individual has completed initial eight years of education i.e., middle but 
below matriculation; = 0, otherwise .08483 .1285 .1206 
Matric 
 
 =1 if individual has completed initial ten years of education i.e., matriculation 
but below intermediate; = 0, otherwise .2251 .1686 .2097 
Inter 
 
 =1 if individual has completed two years for college education i.e., intermediate 
after matriculation but below university degree; = 0, otherwise .1619 .0619 .0890 
Professional = if individual has professional degree in engineering, medicine, computer and 
agriculture; = 0, otherwise .0350 .0195 .0345 
University 
 
= 1 if individual has university degree but below post graduate; 
= 0, otherwise  .1419 .0573 .1005 
Pgrad = 1 if individual is M.A/M.Sc, M.Phil/Ph.D;= 0, otherwise .1057  .0238 .0890 
Train 
 
= 1 if individual has ever completed any technical/vocational training; 
= 0, otherwise .0658 .0433 .0747 
Urban 
 
=1 if living in urban  area and 
= 0, otherwise 0.5924 0.6429 0.6609 
Punjab =1 if individual resides in Punjab; = 0, otherwise .3691 .5319 .3275 
Sindh = 1 if individual resides in Sindh; = 0, otherwise .2698 0.2766 0.3563 
NWFP = 1 if individual resides in NEFP; = 0, otherwise .1812 .11829 .1321 
Balochistan = 1 if individual resides in Balochistan;= 0, otherwise .1798 .0731 .1839 
Continued— 
Appendix Table A1—(Continued)  
Since Birth = 1 if individual has resided in the district since birth; 
= 0, otherwise .8277 .7861 .7672 
One Year = 1 if individual has resided in the district for one year and 
= 0, otherwise .0085 .0184 .0143 
Four Year = 1 if individual has resided in the district for four years and 
= 0, otherwise .0202 .0437 .0402 
Nine Year =1 if individual has resided in the district for nine years and 
= 0, otherwise .03081 .0433 .0402 
Above Ten = 1 if individual has resided in the district for district more then ten years or 
= 0, otherwise .1126 .10828 .1379 
Gender = 1 if individual is male;= 0, otherwise .8809 .90633 .9741 
Marr =1 if individual is married; = 0, otherwise .8558 .5544 .7701 
Nmarr = 1 if individual is unmarried;= 0, otherwise .1323 .4274 .2241 
Wnd = 1 individual is widowed or divorced; = 0, otherwise .01178 .01813 .00574 
Head = 1 If individual is head of the household; = 0, otherwise .661027 .4187 .6695 
Manager = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .05649 .04412 .10919 
Professionals = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .0972 .0401 .0574 
Technician = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .29244 .08743 .14367 
Clerk = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .14410 .0389 .0891 
Services = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .1259 .2005 .0603 
Skilled = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .01117 .00487 .01436 
Craft = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .04078 .2311 .1637 
Plant = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .03897 .15078 .1637 
Elementary = 1 if individual is in this one-digit occupation group; = 0, otherwise .19274 .2019 .19827 
Sample Size  3310 3694 348 
Notes:  The average values for the continuous measures and the sample proportion for the discrete measures are reported.  The standard deviations are also 
reported for the continuous variables. 
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Table A2  
Quantile Regression Model Estimates for Public Sector, Pakistan 2001-02  
 Uncorrected for Selectivity Bias Corrected for Selectivity Bias 
Variable 
10th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
10th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
Prim 0.0636 
(0.0563) 
0.0852***
(0.0291) 
0.0879***
(0.0259) 
0.0564** 
(0.0261) 
0.0543* 
(0.0417) 
0.0632 
(0.0605) 
0.0516* 
(0.0384) 
0.0681** 
(0.0310) 
0.0740***
(0.0305) 
0.04144 
(0.0458) 
Middle 0.1353*** 
(0.0546) 
0.12026**
(0.0348) 
0.0972***
(0.0274) 
0.0854***
(0.0273) 
0.0569** 
(0.0345) 
0.1357** 
(0.0688) 
0.0749* 
(0.0543) 
0.0671** 
(0.03995) 
0.1200***
(0.0414) 
0.0297 
(0.0529) 
Matric 0.2239*** 
(0.0463) 
0.2238***
(0.0274) 
0.2072***
(0.0283) 
0.1875***
(0.0305) 
0.19179***
(0.0333) 
0.2246***
(0.0822) 
0.1653***
(0.0583) 
0.1598***
(0.0494) 
0.2238***
(0.0511) 
0.1541***
(0.0622) 
Inter 0.3688*** 
(0.0479) 
0.3116***
(0.0289) 
0.2836***
(0.0317) 
0.2968***
(0.0336) 
0.28627 
(0.0463) 
0.3671***
(0.0932) 
0.2410***
(0.0689) 
0.2263***
(0.0629) 
0.3351***
(0.0607) 
0.2432***
(0.0768) 
Profe. 0.4681*** 
(0.0789) 
0.5051***
(0.074) 
0.5662***
(0.0840) 
0.8586***
(0.0993) 
0.8878*** 
(0.1600) 
0.4657***
(0.1039) 
0.4485***
(0.0925) 
0.5155***
(0.0927) 
0.8779***
(0.1111) 
0.8662***
(0.1690) 
University 0.4318*** 
(0.0548) 
0.3981***
(0.0357) 
0.4099***
90.0354) 
0.4436***
(0.0389) 
0.4518*** 
(0.0492) 
0.4300***
(0.0986) 
0.3246***
(0.0718) 
0.3514***
(0.0613) 
0.4854***
(0.0632) 
0.4104** 
(0.0725) 
Pgrad 0.5637*** 
(0.0681) 
0.5845***
(0.0412) 
0.6169***
(0.0431) 
0.6482***
(0.0529) 
0.6830*** 
(0.0641) 
0.5624***
(0.1163) 
0.5138***
(0.0805) 
0.5481***
(0.0711) 
0.6908***
(0.0766) 
0.6407***
(0.0915) 
Train 0.02456 
(0.0327) 
–0.0065 
(0.0419) 
0.04719* 
(0.0366) 
0.0487 
(0.0423) 
0.02842 
(0.0512) 
0.0247 
(0.0341) 
–0.0011 
(0.0423) 
0.0384 
(0.0376) 
0.0578* 
(0.0418) 
0.0246 
(0.0499) 
Age 0.03874***
(0.0144) 
0.0248***
(0.0078) 
0.0129** 
(0.0065) 
0.0118 
(0.0068) 
0.01788** 
(0.0088) 
0.0385** 
(0.0215) 
0.0155 
(0.0128) 
0.0050 
(0.0099) 
0.0181** 
(0.0099) 
0.0127 
(0.0148) 
Agesq –0.0003** 
(0.00018) 
–0.0001** 
(0.00010) 
–0.00002 
(0.00008) 
–7.84E–1 
(0.00009) 
–0.00008 
(0.00011) 
–0.0004* 
(0.00025) 
–.00008 
(0.00015) 
0.00006 
(0.0001) 
–0.00007 
(0.0001) 
–0.00003 
(0.0001) 
Continued— 
Table A2—(Continued) 
Nmarr –0.0422 
(0.0364) 
–0.0393 
(0.0354) 
–0.04002* 
(0.0271) 
–0.0270 
(0.0297) 
0.0103 
(0.0432) 
–0.0403 
(0.0518) 
–0.00009 
(0.0401) 
–0.02316 
(0.0342) 
–0.0464 
(0.0386) 
0.0419 
(0.0530) 
Wnd 0.02492 
(0.1944) 
0.10748 
(0.1072) 
0.1108***
(0.0449) 
–0.0057 
(0.0474) 
0.0904 
(0.1292) 
0.0275 
(0.1997) 
0.1284 
(0.1098) 
0.1370***
(0.0472) 
–0.0275 
(0.0499) 
0.1200 
(0.1317) 
Gender 0.30944***
(0.0756) 
0.1305***
(0.0384) 
0.0682***
(0.0288) 
0.06103**
(0.0267) 
0.1309*** 
(0.03847) 
0.3115***
(0.0791) 
0.1375***
(0.0381) 
0.0785***
(0.0299) 
0.0499** 
(0.0284) 
0.1419***
(0.0418) 
Constant 1.2261*** 
(0.2724) 
1.9037***
(0.1588) 
2.3505***
(0.1348) 
2.58730 
(0.1265) 
2.5756*** 
(0.18616) 
1.2317* 
(0.5137) 
2.1986***
(0.3436) 
2.5924***
(0.2677) 
2.3939***
(0.2504) 
2.7420***
(0.3880 
Selection 
Term 
ƒ 
 
ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ –0.0034 
(0.1614) 
–0.1092 
(0.1022) 
–0.08510 
(0.0877) 
0.0717 
(0.0862) 
–0.0723 
(0.1220) 
R2/ PseudoR2 0.2160 0.2495 0.3034 0.3691 0.4142 0.2630 0.2498 0.3036 0.4142 0.4142 
Sample Size 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 
Notes: See notes to Table 1; ƒ denotes not applicable in estimation. 
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Table A3 
Quantile Regression Model Estimates for Private Sector, Pakistan 2001-02  
 Uncorrected for Selectivity Bias Corrected for Selectivity Bias 
Variable 
10th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
10th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
Prim 0.0719 
(0.0570) 
0.1032*** 
(0.0307) 
0.0636*** 
(0.0261) 
0.0804*** 
(0.0244) 
0.0998*** 
(0.0358) 
0.0555 
(0.0543) 
0.0889*** 
(0.0336) 
0.0427** 
(0.0241) 
0.0757*** 
(0.0281) 
0.1100*** 
(0.0361) 
Middle 0.1993*** 
(0.0516) 
0.1765*** 
(0.0331) 
0.1176*** 
(0.0275) 
0.1455*** 
(0.0348) 
0.2074*** 
(0.0528) 
0.1693*** 
(0.0647) 
0.1526*** 
(0.0447) 
0.0937*** 
(0.0306) 
0.1369*** 
(0.0364) 
0.2248*** 
(0.0529) 
Matric 0.2183*** 
(0.0542) 
0.1632*** 
(0.0346) 
0.1790*** 
(0.0370) 
0.2160*** 
(0.0257) 
0.2611*** 
(0.0424) 
0.1814*** 
(0.0693) 
0.1385*** 
(0.0523) 
0.1433*** 
(0.0430) 
0.1982*** 
(0.0373) 
0.3037*** 
(0.0612) 
Inter 0.3843*** 
(0.065) 
0.3058*** 
(0.0476) 
0.3145*** 
(0.0483) 
0.31143***
(0.0599) 
0.4187*** 
(0.0701) 
0.3364*** 
(0.0920) 
0.2787*** 
(0.0643) 
0.2564*** 
(0.0554) 
0.2865*** 
(0.0716) 
0.4557*** 
(0.0878) 
Profe. 0.7413*** 
(0.1515) 
0.8594*** 
(0.1424) 
1.1016*** 
(0.1272) 
1.0775*** 
(0.1225) 
1.4365*** 
(0.2126) 
0.6951*** 
(0.1729) 
0.7588*** 
(0.1657) 
1.0369*** 
(0.1402) 
1.0730*** 
(0.1224) 
1.4981*** 
(0.2133) 
University 0.6175*** 
(0.1136) 
0.6364*** 
(0.0744) 
0.6939*** 
(0.0592) 
0.7365*** 
(0.0693) 
0.8728*** 
(0.1077) 
0.5765*** 
(0.1149) 
0.5967*** 
(0.0750) 
0.6059*** 
(0.0646) 
0.7112*** 
(0.0732) 
0.9272*** 
(0.1078) 
Pgrad 
 
0.8514*** 
(0.1233) 
1.0437*** 
(0.1451) 
1.0566*** 
(0.0840) 
1.0031*** 
(0.1058) 
1.2283*** 
(0.1829) 
0.7915*** 
(0.1793) 
0.9697*** 
(0.1639) 
0.9511*** 
(0.1044) 
0.9846*** 
(0.1153) 
1.2902*** 
(0.2024) 
Train 0.0316 
(0.0768) 
–0.0093 
(0.0407) 
–0.0543 
(0.0428) 
0.0068 
(0.06145) 
0.2035*** 
(0.0996) 
0.0121 
(0.0774) 
–0.0126 
(0.0439) 
–0.0457 
(0.0404) 
0.0011 
(0.0600) 
0.1761** 
(0.1035) 
Age 0.0452*** 
(0.0117) 
0.05000***
(0.0072) 
0.0467*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0476*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0410*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0403*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0459*** 
(0.0101) 
0.0422*** 
(0.0073) 
0.0431*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0431*** 
(0.0107) 
Continued— 
Table A3—(Continued) 
Agesq –0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
–0.0006***
(0.00009) 
–0.0005*** 
(0.00008) 
–0.0005*** 
(0.00007) 
–0.0004*** 
(0.00014) 
–0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
–0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
–0.0004*** 
(0.00009) 
–0.0004*** 
(0.00009) 
–0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
Nmarr –0.0168 
(0.0598) 
–0.0404 
(0.0344) 
–0.0242 
(0.0289) 
–0.0249 
(0.0285) 
–0.0992** 
(0.05032) 
–0.0046 
(0.0643) 
–0.0269 
(0.0347) 
0.0097 
(0.0299) 
–0.0179 
(0.0275) 
–0.1314*** 
(0.0539) 
Wnd –0.0060 
(0.1199) 
–0.02608 
(0.0728) 
0.0048 
(0.0882) 
–0.0963 
(0.0871) 
–0.0836 
(0.1745) 
0.0203 
(0.1251) 
–0.0288 
(0.0915) 
0.0411 
(0.0793) 
–0.0820 
(0.0893) 
–0.1183 
(0.1956) 
Gender 0.6251*** 
(0.0862) 
0.5521*** 
(0.0558) 
0.4371*** 
(0.0481) 
0.32504***
(0.0439) 
0.24911*** 
(0.0659) 
0.6214*** 
(0.0816) 
0.5318*** 
(0.0620) 
0.4238*** 
(0.0437) 
0.3164*** 
(0.0457) 
0.2610*** 
(0.0576) 
Constant 0.2459 
(0.2393) 
0.6076*** 
(0.1544) 
1.1228*** 
(0.1313) 
1.4093*** 
(0.1194) 
2.0070*** 
(0.2271) 
0.2763 
(0.2256) 
0.6577*** 
(0.1541) 
1.1278*** 
(0.1363) 
1.4375*** 
(0.1313) 
2.0106*** 
(0.2080) 
Selection Term ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 0.0983 
(0.1382) 
0.0789 
(0.0889) 
0.1326** 
(0.0699) 
0.0753 
(0.0718) 
–0.1059 
(0.1138) 
R2/ PseudoR2 0.2130 0.2166 0.2288 0.2775 0.3286 0.2132 0.2168 0.2294 0.2777 0.3288 
Sample Size 3694 3694 3694 3694 3694 3694 3694 3694 3694 3694 
Notes: See notes to Table 1;  ƒ denotes not applicable in estimation. 
Table A4 
Quantile Regression Model Estimates for SOE(State-owned Enterprises) Sector, Pakistan 2001-02 
 Uncorrected for Selectivity Bias Corrected for Selectivity Bias 
Variable 
10th   
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
10th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
Primary –0.1276 
(0.2024) 
0.0070 
(0.1477) 
0.0338 
(0.0999) 
0.1234 
(0.1071) 
0.0223 
(0.1972) 
–0.08512 
(0.2565) 
0.0307 
(0.1557) 
0.0297 
(0.1110) 
0.1238 
(0.1161) 
0.0656 
(0.2280) 
Middle 0.1264 
(0.1697) 
0.1929** 
(0.1101) 
0.0560 
(0.0816) 
0.1485* 
(0.1157) 
–0.0067 
(0.1435) 
0.0968 
(0.1893) 
0.2292** 
(0.1163) 
0.0580 
(0.1019) 
0.1677 
(0.1368) 
0.0680 
(0.1547) 
Matric 0.1959 
(0.1849) 
0.3516***
(0.1229) 
0.1843***
(0.0756) 
0.1808* 
(0.1009) 
0.1268 
(0.1398) 
0.1463 
(0.1964) 
0.4229***
(0.1361) 
0.1876** 
(0.0962) 
0.1839* 
(0.1186) 
0.2415* 
(0.1591) 
Inter 0.0093 
(0.2080) 
0.1855 
(0.1795) 
0.3404** 
(0.1684) 
0.3906***
(0.1492) 
0.2793* 
(0.2177) 
0.0393 
(0.1792) 
0.2257* 
(0.1606) 
0.3367** 
(0.1957) 
0.3830***
(0.1462) 
0.4321** 
(0.2401) 
Profe. 0.2972 
(0.2962) 
0.6066***
(0.2566) 
0.3967** 
(0.2103) 
0.4252* 
(0.3501) 
0.4292 
(0.6797) 
0.3351 
(0.2864) 
0.5800***
(0.2482) 
0.4003** 
(0.1958) 
0.4330 
(0.3551) 
0.6265 
(0.6916) 
University 0.0345 
(0.2739) 
0.4378***
(0.1753) 
0.4455***
(0.1851) 
0.5852***
(0.2026) 
0.5719** 
(0.2573) 
0.2517 
(0.2788) 
0.4706***
(0.1651) 
0.4567***
(0.1894) 
0.5774***
(0.2222) 
0.6880***
(0.2773) 
P/Grad 0.3502* 
(0.2731) 
0.6316***
(0.1885) 
0.6637***
(0.1586) 
0.6376***
(0.1826) 
0.5909*** 
(0.2495) 
0.3873 
(0.3105) 
0.6921***
(0.5055) 
0.6626***
(0.1562) 
0.6475***
(0.2122) 
0.7322***
(0.2829) 
Training –0.0689 
(0.3120) 
0.0336 
(0.1792) 
–0.0035 
(0.1368) 
0.0718 
(0.1799) 
0.1109 
(0.2316) 
–0.2011 
(0.3175) 
0.0003 
(0.1586) 
0.0046 
(0.1523) 
0.0902 
(0.1893) 
0.1108 
(0.2433) 
Age 0.1017*** 
(0.0385) 
0.0401** 
(0.0219) 
0.0477***
(0.0199) 
0.0516** 
(0.0231) 
0.0365 
(0.0382) 
0.0748* 
(0.0472) 
0.0457** 
(0.0252) 
0.0474** 
(0.0214) 
0.0537** 
(0.0243) 
0.05159 
(0.0426) 
Continued— 
Table A4—(Continued) 
Agesq –0.0012*** 
(0.0005) 
–0.0003 
(0.0002) 
–0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
–0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
–0.0003 
(0.0005) 
–0.0008* 
(0.0006) 
–0.0003 
(0.0003) 
–0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
–0.0005** 
(0.0003) 
–0.0005 
(0.0005) 
Nmarr –0.1551 
(0.1722) 
–0.1761 
(0.1177) 
–0.0709 
(0.0889) 
–0.1041 
(0.1026) 
–0.1624 
(0.1680) 
–0.1742 
(0.1911) 
–0.1605 
(0.1431) 
–0.0700 
(0.1135) 
–0.0966 
(0.1180) 
–0.1355 
(0.1843) 
Wnd 0.3026 
(0.5914) 
0.1897 
(0.4177) 
–0.2916 
(0.3105) 
0.0144 
(0.2942) 
–0.0248 
(0.3168) 
0.4042 
(0.5958) 
0.2328 
(0.4088) 
–0.3001 
(0.3155) 
–0.0189 
(0.2823) 
–0.1077 
(0.3234) 
Gender 0.2509 
(0.3322) 
0.4950** 
(0.2757) 
0.2781* 
(0.1895) 
0.4163*** 
(0.1703) 
0.7361** 
(0.2582) 
0.1853 
(0.4833) 
0.6338** 
(0.3548) 
0.2963 
(0.2605) 
0.4632** 
(0.2448) 
0.8258 
(0.3546) 
Constant 0.2577 
(0.8258) 
0.9368** 
(0.4705) 
1.1735*** 
(0.3992) 
1.3720** 
(0.4960) 
1.6358** 
(0.8238) 
1.4758 
(2.3333) 
0.0642 
(1.4558) 
1.0891 
(1.1111) 
1.0678 
(1.2563) 
0.5074 
(1.562) 
Selection Term ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ –0.3270 
(0.6406) 
0.2746 
(0.3992) 
0.0306 
(0.2972) 
0.08664 
(0.3377) 
0.2485 
(0.3961) 
R2/ PseudoR2 0.3103 0.3587 0.4365 0.4128 0.4354 0.3112 0.3595 0.4129 0.4366 0.4368 
Sample Size 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 
Notes: See notes to Table 1;  ƒ denotes not applicable in estimation. 
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Table A5 
OLS Estimates for Public, Private, and SOE Sectors, Pakistan 2001-02 
 Without Correction for 
Selectivity Bias 
With Correction for 
Selectivity Bias 
Variable      Public      Private      SOE     Public     Private      SOE 
Prim 0.06145** 
(0.0292) 
0.0946*** 
(0.0250) 
0.01117 
(0.1141) 
0.0607** 
(0.0351) 
0.0849*** 
(0.0268) 
0.0107 
(0.1132) 
Middle 0.0906*** 
(0.0276) 
0.1829*** 
(0.0296) 
0.04624 
(0.0881) 
0.0895** 
(0.0414) 
0.1676*** 
(0.0339) 
0.0416 
(0.0939) 
Matric  0.21640*** 
(0.0268) 
0.2142*** 
(0.029) 
0.1738** 
(0.0914) 
0.2149*** 
(0.0523) 
0.1911*** 
(0.0385) 
0.1688** 
(0.0972) 
Inter 0.32102*** 
(0.0323) 
0.3614*** 
(0.0411) 
0.2404* 
(0.1363) 
0.3191*** 
(0.0631) 
0.3295*** 
(0.0525) 
0.2384** 
(0.1373) 
Profe. 0.68430*** 
(0.0769) 
1.0585*** 
(0.1031) 
0.5095** 
(0.2192) 
0.6827*** 
(0.0917) 
1.0319*** 
(0.107) 
0.5034** 
(0.2209) 
University 0.44876*** 
(0.0352) 
0.7135*** 
(0.0506) 
0.4578** 
(0.1758) 
0.4470*** 
(0.0637) 
0.6815*** 
(0.0604) 
0.454*** 
(0.1769) 
Pgrad 0.64456*** 
(0.0434) 
1.0709*** 
(0.0819) 
0.5756*** 
(0.1515) 
0.6425*** 
(0.0764) 
1.0204*** 
(0.097) 
0.5701*** 
(0.1559) 
Train 0.04767* 
(0.03715) 
0.0233 
(0.0478) 
0.0213 
(0.1575) 
0.0475 
(0.038) 
0.0184 
(0.047) 
0.0194 
(0.1647) 
Age 0.02016*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0445*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0410** 
(0.0217) 
0.0198** 
(0.0107) 
0.0414*** 
(0.007) 
0.0403** 
(0.0229) 
Agesq –0.00012* 
(0.00008) 
–0.0004*** 
(0.00008) 
–0.00034 
(0.0002) 
–0.0001 
(0.0001) 
–0.0004*** 
(0.00008) 
–0.0003 
(0.00030) 
Nmarr –0.0509* 
(0.0293) 
–0.0543** 
(0.0303) 
–0.1789** 
(0.0974) 
–0.0571* 
(0.0364) 
–0.0424* 
(0.0323) 
–0.1816** 
(0.1076) 
Wnd 0.08029* 
(0.0615) 
–0.0325 
(0.0744) 
0.04133 
(0.2745) 
0.0809 
(0.0652) 
–0.0163 
(0.0756) 
0.0484 
(0.2927) 
Gender 0.14957*** 
(0.0293) 
0.42797***
(0.0431) 
0.3535*** 
(0.1341) 
0.1498*** 
(0.0304) 
0.4240*** 
(0.0433) 
0.3404** 
(0.1953) 
Constant 2.10676*** 
(0.1299) 
1.0927*** 
(0.1329) 
1.4248*** 
(0.41070) 
2.1151*** 
(0.2846) 
1.1028*** 
(0.1337) 
1.5129* 
(1.0240) 
Selection Term ƒ ƒ ƒ –0.0030 
(0.0941) 
0.0683 
(0.0664) 
–0.0252 
(0.2696) 
R-squared 
 
0.4609 0.3948 0.5465 0.4609 0.3949 0.5465 
Sample Size 3310 3948 348 3310 3948 348 
Notes: See notes to Table 1;  ƒ denotes not applicable in estimation. 
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Table A6 
Rates of Return to Educational Qualifications in Pakistan 
 Public Sector Private Sector Differential 
Primary  0.0121*** 
(0.0070) 
 0.0170*** 
(0.0054) 
–0.0049 
(0.0088) 
Middle  0.0100 
(0.0112) 
 0.0275*** 
(0.0104) 
–0.0175 
(0.0153) 
Matriculation  0.0627*** 
(0.0261) 
 0.0118 
(0.0172) 
 0.0509 
(0.0312) 
Intermediate  0.0521*** 
(0.0129) 
 0.0693*** 
(0.0210) 
–0.0172 
(0.0246) 
Professional  0.0723*** 
(0.0143) 
 0.1405*** 
(0.0208) 
–0.0682*** 
(0.0252) 
Undergraduate    0.0639*** 
(0.0138) 
 0.1760*** 
(0.0267) 
–0.1121*** 
(0.0300) 
Postgraduate  0.0977*** 
(0.0194) 
 0.1694*** 
(0.0429) 
–0.0717 
(0.0471) 
Notes: (a) The rates of return are computed using the estimates from the mean regression corrected for  
selectivity bias. 
 (b) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 (c) ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level 
respectively using two-tailed tests. 
 (d) In computing the rates of return we assumed primary=5 years; middle=3 years; 
matriculation=2 years; intermediate=2 years; professional=5; undergraduate=2 years; and 
postgraduate = 2 years. 
 
Table A7 
Decomposition of Sectoral Wage Gaps at Selected Quantiles:  SOE/Private 
 Due to 
Treatment 
Due to 
Endowments 
Selection 
Terms Residuals Total 
SOE/Privateθ=0.10 0.3398*** 
(0.0415) 
0.2298*** 
(0.0256) 
Not applicable 0.0366 0.6063 
 1.1358 
(1.3547) 
0.1392 
(0.1878) 
–0.7028 0.0342 0.6063 
SOE/Private θ=0.25 0.2999*** 
(0.0691) 
–0.3785 
(0.3374) 
Not applicable 0.6189 0.5404 
 –0.2699 
(0.9420) 
–0.3964 
(0.3311) 
0.5125 0.6942 0.5404 
SOE/Private θ=0.5 0.2892*** 
(0.0496) 
0.8486*** 
(0.3514) 
Not applicable –0.5487 0.5891 
 0.2936 
(0.6256) 
0.8501 
 (0.3684) 
–0.0123 –0.5223 0.5891 
SOE/Private θ=0.75 0.2586*** 
(0.0526) 
–0.3559 
(0.3465) 
Not applicable 0.8129 0.7157 
 0.11949 
(0.7122) 
–0.3774 
(0.3569) 
0.1214 0.8522 0.7157 
SOE/Private θ=0.9 0.1735** 
(0.0999) 
0.61006*** 
(0.1224) 
Not applicable –0.0081 0.7755 
 –0.4252 
(0.7774) 
0.6576*** 
(0.1249) 
0.54378 –0.0005 0.7755 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
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Table A8 
Decomposition of Sectoral Wage Gaps at Selected Quantiles:  Public/SOE 
 Due to 
Treatment 
Due to 
Endowments 
Selection 
Terms Residuals Total 
Public/SOEθ=0.10 0.2393*** 
(0.0665) 
0.0040 
(0.0288) 
Not applicable 0.04649 0.2898 
 –0.4124 
(1.2983) 
0.0022 
(0.0784) 
0.6615 0.0386 0.2898 
Public/SOE θ=0.25 0.37846 
(0.3814) 
0.4443*** 
(0.1234) 
Not applicable –0.6212 0.2016 
 1.2687 
(1.0287) 
0.2552 
(0.2367) 
–0.6229 –0.6995 0.2016 
Public/SOE θ=0.5 –0.5377* 
(0.36708) 
0.08799** 
(0.0383) 
Not applicable 0.5130 0.0633 
 –0.4979 
(0.6301) 
0.0926*** 
(0.0380) 
–0.1129 0.5815 0.0633 
Public/SOE θ=0.75 0.4922 
(0.40920) 
0.2415*** 
(0.1054) 
Not applicable –0.8516 –0.1179 
 0.5405 
(0.8832) 
0.3607** 
(0.1739) 
–0.1267 –0.8925 -0.1179 
Public/SOE θ=0.9 –0.1559* 
(0.1204) 
–0.1673* 
(0.1182) 
Not applicable 0.4727 –0.1495 
 0.3653 
(0.7586) 
–0.1193 
(0.1732) 
–0.5048 –0.4083 –0.1495 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
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